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Patents, Trade, and Medicines: Past, Present, and Future 
 
Kenneth C. Shadlen, Bhaven N. Sampat, and Amy Kapczynski 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the spread of intellectual property in trade agreements. We explain how 
the integration of intellectual property with international trade rules led to the globalization 
of pharmaceutical patenting, and then how additional provisions related to pharmaceutical 
products have been introduced by regional and bilateral trade agreements. We describe the 
additional “TRIPS-Plus” rules contained in recent trade agreements, which go beyond the 
requirements of the World Trade Organization’s TRIPS Agreement, and explain the potential 
challenges that they may create for developing countries. We draw attention to the 
conceptual and methodological challenges of assessing the effects of patent provisions in 
trade agreements on prices and access to drugs, with particular emphasis on the importance 
of timing. Depending on when countries began allowing drugs to be patented, TRIPS-Plus 
provisions have different effects; and when pharmaceutical patenting has been in place for 
more countries for more time, the effects of TRIPS-Plus provisions will change again.  
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Historically most developing countries did not allow patents on pharmaceutical products. 
Patent offices existed, and patents were available for machinery and electronics and many 
other areas, but not drugs. This prohibition reflected a calculation that the costs of having 
private rights of exclusion over these sorts of inventions would outweigh the benefits. In the 
closing decades of the 20th century, however, the global politics of intellectual property (IP) 
underwent a fundamental shift: the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) made pharmaceutical patent 
protection obligatory for all WTO members (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Deere 2008; 
Drahos 1995; Dutfield 2003; Maskus 2014). By 2005 pharmaceutical patents were 
universally available, in all but the poorest countries.  
 
Since patents reduce competition, TRIPS generated fears that drug prices in developing 
countries would increase, public health budgets would come under strain, and patients would 
be left without access to essential medicines. These concerns intensified in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, as the HIV/AIDS pandemic reached crisis proportions around the world.  In 
some of the hardest-hit countries such as South Africa, where one in five adults was HIV-
positive, the medicines needed to treat HIV were patented and priced far out of reach, and 
developed countries and companies argued that attempts to bring prices down would violate 
TRIPS (Treatment Action Campaign 2003; Fisher and Rigamonti 2005; Mbali 2013). At 
roughly the same time, a flurry of regional and bilateral trade agreements were negotiated 
between developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the USA (and also 
European Union). These newer agreements, with still more restrictive patent requirements 
that increase the level of protection beyond what is required by TRIPS, further intensified 
fears about the impact of trade agreements on drug prices and health.1  
 
This paper analyzes the spread of these “TRIPS-Plus” rules in bilateral trade agreements, 
describes the patent provisions they include, and explains the challenges that they may create 
for developing countries.2 The paper emphasizes the conceptual and methodological 
challenges of assessing the effects of patent provisions in trade agreements on drug prices, 
including the choice of variables to focus on, how to operationalize these variables, and the 
importance of timing in analyzing the effects of TRIPS-Plus provisions. Because 
pharmaceutical patenting is new in many countries, and on account of the lag time between 
when patents are applied for and when drugs are launched, the full effects of TRIPS and 
TRIP-Plus provisions are not yet felt. Understanding the transitional elements of the spread of 
pharmaceutical patenting is essential for thinking about the effects of TRIPS-Plus provisions 
in trade agreements. Depending on when countries began allowing drugs to be patented, 
                                                          
1 The immense literature on IP in bilateral trade agreements includes el Said (2007), Fink 
and Reichenmiller (2005), Krikorian and Szymkowiak (2007). Kuanpoth (2008), Mercurio 
(2006), Morin (2006, 2009), Osgood and Feng (2017), Roffe and Spennemann (2006), Sell 
(2007, 2010b), Seuba (2013), Shadlen (2005, 2009), Son et al (2018), Townsend et al (2018), 
von Braun (2012). 
2 While this paper focuses on the effects of particular provisions in bilateral and regional 
trade agreements, an extensive literature examines the spread of such agreements (Baccini, 
Dür, and Elsig 2015; Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012; Manger 2012; Manger and Shadlen 2014; 
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002; Mansfield and Milner 2012). 
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TRIPS-Plus provisions will have different effects. Once pharmaceutical patent regimes in 
more countries take full effect, the transitional elements of TRIPS will fade in importance, 
but the effects of TRIPS-Plus provisions will likely change again. 
 
The paper has four sections. The first discusses sources of conflicts over patents on 
pharmaceutical products, and describes the process by which pharmaceutical patent 
protection has become globalized since the 1970s. The second examines the key “TRIPS-
Plus” provisions related to pharmaceuticals that are present in the trade agreements that 
nineteen countries have signed with the US. We consider how each provision might affect 
competition and drug prices theoretically, and also describe variation in how such provisions 
are presented in different agreements. The third section argues that the effects of TRIPS-Plus 
provisions in any given country depends on when the country introduced drug patents, as 
well as institutional details of how the provisions are implemented locally. We also explain 
that the types of effects these provisions are likely to have, on the existence or duration of 
patent protection, differ according to how long countries have allowed drug patents, and thus 
are likely to change going forward. The fourth section summarizes the key arguments, 
underscoring the importance, of focusing on the right sets of drugs in the right countries at 
the right times when assessing the impact of TRIPS-Plus provisions in trade agreements. 
 
Pharmaceutical Patents and Developing Countries: Key Issues and Context  
To understand the concerns that TRIPS and the TRIPS-Plus provisions have generated, a 
brief review of the basic law and economics of patents is useful. Patents grant exclusive 
rights over inventions for limited periods in the territories where they are granted. Applicants 
must convince examiners that they have created something novel, inventive (also referred to 
as “non-obvious” in the US), and useful, and then, once granted, the patent will last for 
twenty years from the date of application. For as long as a patent in a given country is in 
effect, the rights to produce and sell goods in that country that include the protected 
knowledge lie solely with the owner of the patent.  
 
By providing firms with means to appropriate the benefits of their investments in research 
and development, patents can create incentives for invention and innovation. Yet because 
patents convert knowledge, something that is non-rivalrous (everyone can use unlimited 
amounts of it without reducing anyone else’s ability to use it) into private property controlled 
by a single owner, the same instrument that incentivizes new inventions also restricts their 
diffusion and use. After all, the idea behind the patent system is that the prospect of supra-
competitive pricing during the period of protection is necessary for creating R&D investment 
incentives. The tradeoff between dynamic benefits (incentives for innovation) and static costs 
(higher prices, reduced access) is inherent to the patent system.  
 
Historically, the relative weight that countries place on the dynamic benefits versus the static 
costs of patents influenced whether they favored more or less protection.3 Countries with few 
innovative firms or small markets typically viewed the benefits of patents as limited, since 
small markets can do little to drive global R&D priorities, and local patents may do more to 
hurt the development of industry than stimulate invention in the absence of a strong industrial 
sector. Countries with more innovative capabilities, in contrast, saw greater benefits in 
patents. The international politics of patents have reflected these different perspectives: 
developing countries have typically sought international rules that allow countries to restrict 
                                                          
3 Chang (2002); Maskus (2014); May (2007); May and Sell (2006); Wallerstein et al. 
(1993). 
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what sort of knowledge is eligible for patents and reduce patent-holders’ rights of exclusion, 
and developed countries have sought rules that would harmonize national practices and thus 
make it easier for innovators to obtain and defend patents across the globe (Drahos 1997; 
Maskus 2014). 
 
Conflicts over patents are particularly acute in the area of pharmaceuticals. Drug 
development is expensive (reported R&D/sales ratios are higher than in most other 
industries), both because of uncertainties in science (i.e. most research fails to yield 
marketable products) and the need to undertake clinical trials to receive regulatory approval 
for new products (Scherer 2000). But once developed, drugs are easy to replicate: it is 
comparatively simple for one firm to produce an identical version of a drug developed by 
another firm.4 The relative ease of replication means that patents are important for warding 
off competition and thus capturing the benefits of their investments in technological 
innovation and product development.5 Unlike other industries, where first-mover advantages, 
lead time, secrecy, and other factors are effective at helping firms appropriate returns from 
R&D, patents are rated as particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry.6 
 
Another characteristic of the pharmaceutical sector that fuels originator firms’ interests in 
obtaining and retaining patent protection are the considerable delays between invention and 
launch. Patent applications, to meet standards of novelty, need to be filed early, typically 
within one year of the invention being made, at a point when the associated drugs that the 
patent aims to protect ordinarily will still be in the product development stage. And the 
development stage in pharmaceuticals is long: the path from establishment of a new 
compound to having a useful product takes years, as do the clinical trials that are necessary to 
obtain regulatory approval. By the time a drug protected by a patent is placed on the market, 
a significant chunk of the patent term may have lapsed, and patent owners are fiercely 
concerned with their rights of exclusion in the remaining years. Originator firms typically do 
all they can to ward off competitors during the periods of protection promised by their patents 
and, if possible, extend periods of protection. 
 
The costs of providing single suppliers with exclusive rights to produce and sell particular 
drugs are well known. Many drugs have few functional substitutes. Patients with one 
condition (e.g., hypertension) cannot ordinarily be treated with medicines for other conditions 
(e.g., chronic pain); nor can pharmaceutical firms that produce hypertension drugs do so 
using molecules that reduce pain. Not only is the range of appropriate alternatives in each 
                                                          
4 The statement regarding the ease of replication is particularly so in the case of the 
chemical-based pharmaceutical products. Replication of protein-based biological drugs is 
more complex. 
5 The investments made by pharmaceutical firms may be in-house investments, or they 
may entail licensing or purchasing patents from smaller firms or public sector researchers. 
Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) and Cleary et al (2018) discuss the relative roles of private 
and public actors in pharmaceutical research and development. 
6 Dutfield (2003); Grabowski (2002); Levin et al. (1987); Mansfield (1986); Mansfield et 
al (1981). In addition to patents, pharmaceutical firms also rely on trademarks to promote 
their brand names and preserve market shares in the absence of patents. The concern with 
trademarks is not restricted to originator firms, however, as producers of off-patent “branded 
generics” use trademarks too. 
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therapeutic class often limited, but even when alternatives exist, drugs that treat the same 
condition may have different side effects and be tolerated differently. Thus for many 
individuals there is in effect just one useful treatment. Restricting access to new medicines 
lacking functional substitutes through patents may thus have profound costs in terms of 
health and well-being. These costs are not always visible, as they are when patients unable to 
get essential medicines die. Instead, the costs may be incurred in terms of patients suffering 
on account of using older, inferior drugs (or none). There are also potential broader effects. 
When governments allocate the resources towards expensive patented medicines for one 
disease, less resources are available in healthcare budgets overall.7 Additional measures to 
prevent high prices, such as price controls, can ameliorate some of these harms if they are 
effectively deployed. But administering price control systems is challenging, because they are 
technically and administratively demanding. Where markets are small, companies may also 
respond to attempts to control prices by threatening to withdraw their products altogether, 
compounding the difficulty of effectively using these measures.8  
 
Historically many countries have treated the costs of granting patents on drugs as exceeding 
the benefits.9 Reluctance to grant pharmaceutical product patents reflects not only these costs 
discussed in the previous paragraph, but also an expectation that any individual country’s 
drug patent protection (except for very rich countries) has only limited impact on global R&D 
incentives.10  
 
Until recently allowing pharmaceutical patents was the exception and not the rule around the 
world. While pharmaceutical patents have long been available in the USA, this was not the 
case in other wealthy countries. In Europe, for example, as late as 1970 only Britain, France 
and West Germany allowed drugs to be patented. Japan did not begin granting 
pharmaceutical patents until 1976. Then, from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, 
pharmaceutical patenting became the norm throughout the “Global North”: Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland in the late 1970s; Canada, Denmark, and Austria 
in the 1980s; Australia, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and Spain in the 
early 1990s.11  
 
                                                          
7 To be sure, prices are not the only factor affecting access to medicines, but it is a 
threshold condition of access in many resource poor settings. 
8 The extent to which countries have price controls on patented drugs, and these are 
enforced, is not clear. One important study on the effects of pharmaceutical patent protection 
(Kyle and Qian 2014), acknowledging the difficulty of observing price controls, uses fixed 
effects to capture the impact of all countervailing measures at the country level that might 
mitigate the effects of patents (including, potentially, price controls). 
9Chaudhuri (2005); Dutfield (2003); La Croix and Liu (2008, 2009); Mazzoleni and 
Nelson (1998); Nogués (1990, 1993); Watal (2000); WHO (1997). 
10 Some countries also expressed moral objections to patents on drugs (Ayyangar 1959). 
11Finland, which allowed pharmaceutical patents in 1995, was the last West European 
country to do so. La Croix and Liu (2009), Liu and La Croix (2015), and Qian (2007) provide 
cross-national data. See also discussions in Boldrin and Levine (2008), Cassier (2008), 
Dutfield (2003), Gaudillière (2008), UNCTAD (1981), WHO (1997). 
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At the same time as pharmaceutical patenting was becoming normalized in the “Global 
North,” many countries in the “Global South” resisted making patents available for 
pharmaceutical products.12 Observers of IP often refer to a U-shaped relationship between 
national income levels and the extent of IP protection, with middle-income countries offering 
less protection than high-income (and low-income) countries (Chen and Puttitanun 2005; 
Maskus 2000). In the case of pharmaceuticals, this is not accurate over the course of history, 
as pharmaceutical patents were hardly available anywhere as of the mid-1970s, but accurately 
describes the situation as of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when negotiations over TRIPS 
were underway (La Croix and Liu 2009).13 
 
It was in this context, with pharmaceutical patents broadly available in wealthy countries but 
unavailable elsewhere, that the transnational pharmaceutical sector mobilized to universalize 
pharmaceutical patent protection. Drug companies and their representatives were among the 
leading advocates of TRIPS, and more generally, of the integration of IP into the trade regime 
(Drahos 1995; Ryan 1998; Matthews 2001; Sell 2003). The pharmaceutical lobby’s highest 
priority was to make sure that the protection available in developed countries was also 
available in developing countries. Through successful lobbying, the pharmaceutical industry 
made the goal of universalizing patent protection a priority of US and European governments, 
too. Increasingly IP became an important element of the US and European Community’s 
foreign economic policies.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement was the outcome of these efforts. Among other requirements, TRIPS 
mandates that all countries allow pharmaceutical product patents. Countries where this would 
be new, those that as of 1995 were not already granting pharmaceutical patents, had the 
option of waiting until 2005 to do so. Some did so earlier, in anticipation. By 2005 all but the 
world’s poorest countries had begun to allow pharmaceutical product patents.14  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the global expansion of pharmaceutical patenting from 1960 to 2005. The 
vertical axis shows the number of countries that allowed drug patent protection. There are 
roughly three periods: (i) prior to the mid-1970s, pharmaceutical products were eligible for 
protection in only a few countries (e.g. in 1960 this was the case only in the UK and USA); 
(ii) from the mid-1970s to the early-1990s, pharmaceutical patenting became more 
widespread in the “Global North”; (iii) from the mid-1990s onward it becomes nearly 
universal (in 130 countries).15 With regard to the third period, much of the increase in the 
                                                          
12 Patents on pharmaceutical processes are easier to circumvent and constitute a weaker 
form of protection. In this paper, “pharmaceutical patents” is used to refer to patents on 
products, including active ingredients and different compositions and forms of drugs. 
13 In fact, there was a moment, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, before many postcolonial 
countries that had inherited pharmaceutical patent regimes altered their rules and before many 
wealthier countries began to allow pharmaceutical patents, that more countries in the Global 
South formally allowed pharmaceutical patents than did countries in the Global North. 
14 The transition period for Least Developed Countries was until 2016, subsequently 
extended to 2033 (https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/trip_06nov15_e.htm). Yet 
even for LDCs this is a transition period and not an exemption. Eventually, all WTO 
members will be obligated to allow pharmaceutical patents. 
15 Note that the figure may overstate the existence of pharmaceutical patenting in the pre-
TRIPS era by counting only formal aspects of legislation, as many of the countries that 
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early 1990s was attributable to the adoption of pharmaceutical patents by post-Communist 
countries in East Europe and Central Asia (including new countries created by the breakup of 
the USSR and Yugoslavia), as well as countries introducing patent protection in anticipation 
of TRIPS, and then, the substantial after 1995 is a phenomenon of developing countries 
introducing pharmaceutical patent systems in compliance with TRIPS. 
 
-- Figure 1: The Globalization of Pharmaceutical Patenting – 
 
The transition period mentioned above is important for understanding the impact of TRIPS 
and TRIPS-Plus elements of subsequent trade agreements. Although TRIPS entered into 
force in 1995, countries that were not already granting pharmaceutical patents were allowed 
up to ten years to begin doing so. Regardless of how much of this transition period countries 
chose to utilize, whether they started allowing pharmaceutical patents in 1995, waited until 
2005, or anytime in between, TRIPS also obligated countries to receive applications filed as 
of January 1995, when the Agreement formally entered into effect. These “mailbox” 
applications would be examined once the country’s transition period expired. For example, if 
in response to TRIPS a country changed its law to make pharmaceuticals patentable as of 
January 1, 2000, when this date came around the patent office would begin examining 
applications, not only from this date forward but those filed since 1995 and retained in the 
mailbox. Importantly, countries were not required to consider applications filed prior to 
1995. For countries that did not previously allow pharmaceutical product patents, which was 
the case for most developing countries, it is if the world of drug patenting started in 1995.  
 
The 1995 threshold means that the full effects of TRIPS on pharmaceutical markets would 
not be felt for a considerable period of time. The “primary” patents on the compounds of 
most drugs put on the market in the late 1990s and early 2000s were first filed prior to 1995 
(Sampat and Shadlen 2015). For these drugs, in countries that adopted pharmaceutical patents 
after TRIPS but adhered to the 1995 cutoff date, patent protection could only be obtained via 
weaker, “secondary” patents on alternative forms, compositions, or uses of these molecules. 
But this is transitional: drugs based on post-1995 molecules are likely to be protected by 
primary patents in most countries. That is, going forward, we expect most new drugs to have 
at least one strong patent in all countries that are members of the WTO and party to TRIPS.16 
The cutoff date interacts with the specifics of a drug’s patent landscape in influencing the 
likely impact of TRIPS-Plus provisions on generic competition and drug prices, as we discuss 
in more detail below.  
 
TRIPS-Plus Provisions in Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements 
As pharmaceutical patenting has become nearly universal, the relevant question is how 
countries’ drug patent systems function. Even where countries grant patents, policymakers 
and regulators across the world can enact policies to try to mitigate the costs. For example 
countries may try to ensure that once patents expire competition can begin quickly, or that 
                                                          
introduced patents were newly independent states in West Africa that emulated the French or 
British patent systems but where de facto protection remained weak. 
16 See Sampat and Shadlen (2015) for an elaboration of this argument. As discussed there 
(see also Sampat and Shadlen 2018) this assumption would be incorrect if countries 
implemented provisions that restricted grants of primary patents. As far as we know no 
countries have such provisions on the books, but it is possible that provisions to minimize 
secondary patents, such as Section 3(d) in India, could spill over to primary patents as well. 
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patent-holders’ sole rights to sell their products do not lead to prohibitively high prices and 
impinge on access. Although TRIPS requires all countries to allow pharmaceutical patents, it 
leaves substantial leeway for countries to include provisions that may address these concerns 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002; Correa 2000; Reichman 1996, 2009b, 
2009a; Shadlen 2017; ‘t Hoen et al 2018; UNCTAD-ICTSD 2005).  The effects of offering 
pharmaceutical patents thus depends in part on how actively countries took advantage of 
these TRIPS “flexibilities.” 
 
Working in the opposite direction, regional and bilateral trade agreements also affect how 
pharmaceutical patent systems function. The United States, European Union, and Japan have 
all negotiated a large number of trade agreements with developing countries. Importantly, 
these agreements typically include chapters on IP that place obligations on countries beyond 
what the WTO requires (see note 1). That is, regional and bilateral trade agreements remove 
many of the flexibilities available under TRIPS, subjecting signatory countries’ patent 
systems to stricter provisions.  
 
Not all “TRIPS-Plus” provisions in trade agreements are relevant to pharmaceuticals or likely 
to affect drug prices, access to medicines and health. The most common – and controversial – 
provisions that may impede generic competition and raise the price of medicines are: (1) 
requirements that countries extend patent terms to compensate for regulatory delays (2) 
requirements to grant patents on new uses of existing medicines; (3) rules linking the 
activities of health regulators and patent offices around the launch of generic drugs; (4) 
requirements relating to exclusivity provided to test data, and (5) restrictions on the use of 
compulsory licenses.  
 
We describe these provisions below, and present data on which of the 13 US trade 
agreements (including 19 countries) include each. Our description of “TRIPS-Plus” 
provisions is based on the final text of each trade agreement, available at the USTR’s website 
(https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements). For each agreement, we reviewed 
the chapters on intellectual property, and we also searched for additional provisions related to 
pharmaceuticals. 
 
Patent term restoration 
Obligations to extend the length of patent terms come from separate provisions in trade 
agreements, one on patent delays (relevant to all technological classes) and one on regulatory 
delays (specific to pharmaceuticals). Trade agreements with this first provision require 
countries to extend patent terms to compensate for “unreasonable” delays in the course of 
patent office prosecution. While provisions of this sort appear in nearly all of the US 
agreements, there is some variation in how “unreasonable” is defined and therefore when 
extensions become obligatory. Some agreements define “unreasonable” as a delay of more 
than four years after the national filing date or two years after the applicant requested 
examination in the local patent office, while others define this as five years after the national 
filing date or three years after request for examination.17 
 
Some agreements also include provisions that require countries to extend patent terms to 
compensate for “unreasonable curtailment” of the patent term due to the time it takes for 
health authorities to authorize firms to commercialize their drugs. (This idea is modelled on 
                                                          
17The trade agreement with South Korea is intermediate, defining an unreasonable delay as 
four years after filing and three years after the applicant has requested examination. 
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patent term restoration provisions in the US Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984.) Though language 
of this sort appears also in most agreements, most do not define what “unreasonable” means. 
There is also variation here: some agreements present extension of the patent term as an 
obligation (i.e. countries “shall” make it possible for the firm to obtain a request of the patent 
period), while other agreements stipulate that countries “may” make extensions available.  
 
Requirements to grant “use” patents 
Trade agreements may require countries to grant patents on new uses of existing drugs. 
Taking out multiple patents on different aspects of a drug in order to cordon off competitors 
is standard practice in pharmaceuticals. In addition to primary patents on compounds, firms 
commonly attempt to acquire secondary patents on alternative forms of molecules, different 
formulations, dosages, and compositions, and new uses of existing drugs (Howard 2007; 
Kapczynski, Park, and Sampat 2012). Because these additional patents are typically filed 
later and thus expire later, they can extend periods of exclusivity. Some countries have 
introduced measures to minimize the grant of secondary patents, including patents on new 
uses, on the grounds that they are less likely to satisfy traditional standards of novelty and 
inventive step (Correa 2007; Sampat and Shadlen 2017). While granting pharmaceutical 
patents is obligatory under TRIPS, restrictive measures toward some types of pharmaceutical 
patents, be they statutory or via patent office guidelines, are permissible. Provisions 
stipulating that countries must grant “use” patents thus constitute another way that trade 
agreements may produce patent systems that go beyond what is required by TRIPS. This 
obligation is less common than term extensions, appearing in just five of the US agreements 
(Australia, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, South Korea). There is variation in how this provision 
is phrased across agreements: some refer to new uses, others to new methods of use of known 
products, still others to new methods of treatment.18 
 
Coordination between health and patent authorities (“linkage”) 
For a pharmaceutical firm to place a drug on the market, it needs regulatory approval. This is 
true for both originator drugs and follow-on “generic” drugs. Ordinarily regulatory approval 
is separate from patents, a different decision based on different criteria and made by different 
state actors. Some trade agreements, however, require that health and patent offices 
coordinate their actions, demanding health authorities to consider the patent status of a drug 
before granting marketing authorization. This form of coordination, joining the actions of two 
different state agencies, is often referred to as “linkage.” Linkage can extend periods of 
exclusivity if marketing approval is denied on account of patents that, though granted, may be 
of questionable validity, or patents that, even if valid, are not being infringed by the proposed 
generic product. All of the US trade agreements negotiated in the 2000s include provisions of 
this sort, though again there is variation in what is required of partner countries. In some 
instances the obligation is only to notify patent-holders of requests to obtain marketing 
approval made by third parties while a drug is under patent, though more commonly the 
                                                          
18 Use patents (including methods of use and treatment) are but one form of secondary 
patents. In the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), there was at one point a 
proposed provision to prohibit clauses like India’s Section 3(d), which aims to create a higher 
barrier for the grant of a wider array of secondary patents, but this broader language is not in 
US agreements (nor the final text of the TPP).  
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notification obligation is supplemented by a prohibition on the state granting marketing 
approval.19  
 
Data exclusivity 
How countries treat test data that firms provide health authorities can potentially affect 
generic competition, and thus prices. When an originator firm seeks to launch a drug in a 
country, the firm will submit clinical trial data to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
product. If local health authorities use these same data to judge applications by manufacturers 
of generic medicines for regulatory approval of their follow-on drugs, then these products can 
be launched once the originator firm’s patent protection ends. If not, however, firms either 
need to generate their own data, which is costly, or wait until the period of data protection 
ends, which would delay the onset of generic competition.20 According to TRIPS, countries 
must protect test data against disclosure and “unfair commercial use,” but without specifying 
what constitutes “unfair commercial use.” As a result, TRIPS does not address whether 
regulatory authorities can, without disclosing the data, rely on the data submitted by 
originator firms for the sake of approving other firms’ follow-on products.21 Nor does TRIPS 
specify how long such protection should last. 
 
US trade agreements exceed TRIPS on these dimensions, requiring that countries treat test 
data with exclusivity and specifying the periods of exclusivity. Here again there is substantial 
variation in what is required. Some agreements extend data exclusivity not just to new drugs 
but also to new uses or indications of existing drugs. Some prohibit countries from 
authorizing generic drugs on the basis of data provided to foreign regulators.22 Others replace 
minimum periods of data exclusivity with minimum periods of market exclusivity. Some 
refer not just to chemical drugs but also biologic products (Shaikh 2016). Data exclusivity 
provides originator drug companies with monopoly positions that are separate from the 
                                                          
19The most recent agreements (Colombia, Panama, Peru) include both notification and 
prohibition clauses and also encourage governments to create mechanisms that simplify the 
process by which firms seeking to commercialize their drugs can challenge the validity of 
existing patents or make the case that their product is non-infringing. This provision is closest 
to the way “linkage” functions in the US. In fact, the relevant passages of these three 
agreements also call for rewards to be made available to incentivize generic firms to 
challenge the validity of existing patents, a hallmark of the US system (Hemphill and Sampat 
2012).  
20 Protection of test data is also relevant for agricultural chemicals, though the discussion 
here is restricted to the case of pharmaceutical products. 
21 According to many legal scholars, doing so does not amount to “unfair commercial use” 
and is acceptable under TRIPS. The US disagrees and has tried to advance an alternative 
interpretation. The US filed a WTO dispute against Argentina about this, but Argentina 
refused to buckle and the US dropped the case. 
22 Potentially, a country could get around the obligations imposed by strict data exclusivity 
by allowing generic competitors to enter the market if their products are approved by health 
regulators elsewhere. Some agreements close that loophole, meaning that, if a firm obtains 
marketing approval for a new drug in one country it may receive a period of exclusivity even 
if generic competitors have already been authorized in other countries. As discussed below, 
data exclusivity can create situations of single suppliers even in the absence of patents. 
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privileges provided by patents. Data exclusivity periods can run either shorter or longer than 
patent terms, depending on the length of exclusivity and expiration dates of relevant patents. 
 
Compulsory licensing 
Patent laws include exceptions to patent-holders’ ability to exert control over the use of their 
intellectual property. Compulsory licensing is one important exception, where the 
government allows a private firm or government agency to produce or import and distribute a 
patented good without the owner’s consent. Compulsory licenses can directly lead to lower 
prices by allowing generic competition. There is also a potential indirect effect: the ability to 
issue a compulsory license to a local or foreign supplier, including the ability to threaten to 
do so, can be a useful bargaining chip as countries seek to secure lower prices on patented 
drugs with single suppliers (Beall and Kuhn 2012; Reichman 2009a; ‘t Hoen et al 2018; Son 
and Lee 2018). TRIPS leaves countries with discretion in establishing the grounds for making 
a patent subject to compulsory license and the procedures for taking such steps (discretion 
that was affirmed by the 2001 “Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health”), and most trade agreements are silent in this regard as well.23 However, three 
agreements (Australia, Jordan, Singapore) stipulate more restrictive grounds and procedures 
that substantially circumscribe countries’ ability to use this policy tool. 
 
Table 1 lists each country that has a trade agreement with the US that include IP provisions, 
with the date the agreement went into effect. While the Table indicates simply whether the 
agreement includes one of these “TRIPS-Plus” provisions, as discussed in the text these 
should not be regarded as binary but rather continuous variables; countries that each have √ in 
the same column may have different obligations.24 Most agreements include term restoration 
provisions, linkage, and data exclusivity rules. Restrictions on compulsory licensing, and 
language regarding use patents are less common. One agreement, between the US and 
Australia, included all of the provisions, while NAFTA (with the US and Mexico) only 
included one.25 
                                                          
23 For countries lacking local pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities, the purpose of a 
compulsory license would be to secure the drug from foreign suppliers. If the drug is patented 
in the country where that supplier is based, then two compulsory licenses would be needed. 
This process is complicated -- though not prohibited -- by TRIPS’ more restrictive rules 
regarding compulsory licenses for export (Abbott and Reichman 2007). 
24 In no area is the point that some TRIPS-Plus provisions in trade agreements are not 
binary as important as in the case of data exclusivity. For example, one prominent index that 
is used to compares data exclusivity provisions in US and EU trade agreements is based on 
25 different components (Shaikh 2016). Similarly, in Osgood and Feng’s (2017) coding of 23 
different IP provisions in trade agreements (not just those related to pharmaceuticals), 9 
provisions are treated as non-binary variables; seven of these are scored on a 0-2 scale and 
data exclusivity (along with IP protection for animals and plants) ranges from 0-5. 
25 The provisions in the table and discussed in the text are not the only ways that trade 
agreements may affect competition in pharmaceutical markets and prices. Restrictions on 
government procurement and the use of competition policy can undermine countries’ efforts 
to control drug prices, for example, and pharmaceutical firms’ rights to pursue arbitration 
against states via investor-state dispute settlement panels can impede governments’ efforts to 
regulate drug markets. 
12 
 
Assessing the Effects of TRIPS-Plus Provisions and Drug Prices 
The inclusion of these measures in bilateral trade agreements has led to concerns that they 
may have harmful effects on prices and access to medicines in partner countries. Most of the 
academic research on these issues involves hypothetical analyses of how different provisions 
might affect drug prices, with projections of what we should expect to happen as a result of 
the trade agreements. Some studies are mainly descriptive, reviewing what the provisions are 
in specific agreements and how they may affect the price of drugs (Abbott 2011; Baker 2008; 
Roffe and Spennemann 2006). Others are in the style of “impact assessments,” offering 
projections (typically quantitative) of the expected effects of agreements in specific countries 
based on estimations of demand for particular drugs. When Thailand was negotiating a trade 
agreement with the US, for example, Akaleephan et al’s (2009) forecast was based on a 
simulation of how data exclusivity, were it introduced, would increase the prices of patented 
and non-patented drugs in the Thai market.26 More recently, in the context of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, a flurry of papers similarly warned about higher drug prices and 
diminished access to medicines on account of the projected effects of the various provisions 
in that agreement (Baker 2016; Gleeson, Moir, and Lopert 2015; Labonté, Schram, and 
Ruckert 2016; Matthews 2016; Moir et al. 2018). Also of this type are the analyses, 
conducted in the context of negotiations for a trade agreement between the European Union 
and Mercosur, of the projected effects of term extensions and data exclusivity in Argentina 
(Bianco and Bembi 2017) and Brazil (Chaves et al 2017). Both of these studies are based on 
Rovira et al’s (2009) simulation model, which compares projected outcomes under existing 
rules in the absence of a trade agreement with projected outcomes under a range of scenarios. 
 
In addition to these simulations, a handful of studies have attempted to directly assess the 
effects of the agreements after they were signed using drug prices and related measures (e.g. 
drugs as share of health expenditures) as outcome variables. These analyses show mixed 
results. Malpani (2007) and Abbott et al (2012) report higher prices in Jordan as a result of 
“TRIPS-Plus” provisions in the trade agreement with the US. Shaffer and Brenner (2009) 
find similar results in Guatemala as a result of CAFTA. Bollyky (2016), by contrast, 
examines a larger set of countries that have had US agreements over a longer time period and 
finds little impact on drug spending or prices.  
 
It is not surprising that the results are noisy. Nor is it surprising that the main analysis finding 
no strong impact on aggregate measures so far (Bollyky 2016) came to this conclusion. 
Assessing the impact on drug prices (or other outcomes) is extremely complicated, since the 
different provisions in these agreements will affect different drugs at different points in time, 
making identification of both the pre- and post- periods as well as the treated and control sets 
of drugs tricky. Readily available aggregate measures may not tell us much. And for some of 
the important provisions, it is just too soon to tell.  
 
The “priority year” after which drugs were patentable in a country is one crucial variable that 
will influence the impact of trade agreements. As Table 2 shows, most of the countries that 
have trade agreements with the US introduced product patent protection only after TRIPS. In 
                                                          
26 Negotiations on the US-Thai agreement were launched in 2004 but suspended after the 
2006 military coup.  
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these countries, only post-1995 patent applications were eligible.27 Since patents expire 20 
years from filing, the earliest these would expire is in 2015. By contrast, for countries in the 
left panel of Table 2, which introduced drug patenting earlier, patents would expire sooner as 
well.  
 
Knowing countries’ cutoff years for priority dates, and thus when patents will start to expire, 
is crucial, since several of the TRIPS-Plus provisions would plausibly affect competition and 
prices at (or near) the end of patent terms. The clearest case is patent term restoration to 
compensate for delays on the part of national patent offices or health authorities. This 
provision is present in 9 of the US trade agreements (14 countries). By definition, term 
restoration affects generic competition and prices near the end of patent terms. For the 13 
“later patenting” countries, those listed in the right panel of Table 2, the soonest that 
provisions requiring term restoration could affect prices would be 2015. For the 6 “earlier 
patenting” countries, the provisions could affect prices sooner, with the specific dates 
depending on the precise dates that patents became available and the precise cutoff priority 
years for specific drugs. Even here, for provisions calling for term restoration to effect prices, 
they would need to apply retroactively to delays that occurred before the agreement came into 
force.  
 
-- Table 2 Introduction of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Countries with US Trade 
Agreements -- 
 
The timing of potential effects of new use provisions and linkage is more complex. Requiring 
consideration of both “primary” and “secondary” patentsIn the later patenting countries, for 
drugs whose main patents (the stronger primary patents discussed above) have priority years 
after 1995, new use provisions will be redundant to the primary patents until 2015, at least, 
and would have limited effect on prices prior to the expiration of the primary patents. 
However, for pre-1995 molecules – those whose main patents have priority dates before 1995 
– use and other secondary patents are the only type available, and new use provisions may 
matter more.28  
 
The existence of secondary patents on older molecules (drugs whose main patents have pre-
1995 priority dates) also may make linkage provisions important for generic competition and 
prices, since health authorities may deny marketing approval to generic drugs on the basis of 
secondary patents that may not otherwise prevent generic launch. The likelihood of this 
depends on exactly how the linkage system functions, and which patents are included. If 
health authorities were not expected to consider some types of secondary patents, such as use 
patents (see the discussion of Mexico below), then the system’s effects would be limited.  
  
Thus for two of the common provisions in trade agreements (term restoration and linkage) 
and one of the less common provisions (new use patent requirements), the effects would vary 
based on when a country introduced drug patenting, the cut-off date for priority year, the 
                                                          
27 As discussed above, countries that introduced drug patents following TRIPS were 
required to receive applications from 1995 onwards, but had no obligation to consider 
applications with pre-1995 priority dates. 
28 Many drugs approved until relatively recently have pre-1995 priority dates for their 
primary patents (Sampat and Shadlen 2017), reflecting long lags between initial patent filings 
and launch. 
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patent landscape in the country (what types of applications are actually filed and granted 
there), and the specific language of the provisions. For each of these provisions the right 
“treated” set of drugs is not all drugs, and the right “pre” and “post” periods are not based on 
the date of the trade agreement but instead the other institutional details discussed above.    
 
Especially for the provisions that mainly affect generic competition near the end of patent 
terms, in the “later patenting” countries, the number of molecules affected by these 
provisions so far will be quite small, and the effects in terms of extending periods of 
protection will be seen only after the post-1995 filed patents expire. These provisions may, 
eventually, extend periods of protection, once the primary patents on a larger number of post-
1995 molecules expire. But as of now, it may be too early to see the effects, especially in 
broad analyses looking at aggregates like overall drug prices or pharmaceutical expenditures 
as a share of health budgets (e.g. Bollyky 2016).  
 
What about data exclusivity? For drugs that obtain primary patents, data exclusivity periods 
may be redundant: if there is a primary patent in force, the data exclusivity period will likely 
expire before the patent. But data exclusivity can also matter for older drugs whose primary 
patents pre-date a country’s cutoff date, i.e. those where there are no patents or only weaker 
secondary patents.  In these situations, data exclusivity can support monopolies by single 
suppliers, even in the absence of patent protection. Indeed, that is very much the point of data 
exclusivity provisions.  
 
Restrictions on countries’ abilities to issue (or threaten to issue) compulsory licenses is the 
area where the issues of timing we have discussed are least relevant. Regardless of when a 
country introduced drug patents, the ability to issue a compulsory license could help 
governments secure lower prices, and conversely the inability to do so remove originator 
firms’ incentive to lower prices. This is one area where we would expect to see effects (if 
any) for any patented drugs on the market after the trade agreement was implemented.  
However, as discussed above (and in Table 1), such provisions are rare: only three 
agreements address this, for the most part countries with trade agreements have the same 
rights regarding compulsory licensing as counties without such agreements. 
 
In addition to timing, other details of these TRIPS-Plus provisions matter as well, including 
their relationship to national law and practices. Consider the case of patent linkage in Mexico, 
for example. Although not required to do so by its trade agreement with the US (NAFTA), 
Mexico introduced a linkage system in 2003. This required the patent office to publish a 
gazette of drug patents in force, and prohibited health authorities from granting market 
authorization to any drug with a patent in the gazette. When Mexico’s linkage system was 
introduced, it was not expected that the patent office would include patents on medical uses 
in the gazette. But the transnational pharmaceutical sector, through litigation, secured a 
change to the patent office’s practices such that such patents (indeed, all secondary patents) 
are included in the supplementary gazette, and thus have blocking power that allows them to 
extend periods of exclusivity (Cofece 2017; Shadlen 2017: 180-183). This again illustrates 
the difficulties of evaluating the relationship between patent provisions in trade agreements 
and outcomes. None of these aspects would be captured by looking whether a trade 
agreement requires linkage, or even looking just at whether a country has linkage. If, for 
example, we were to compare prices in countries with trade agreements requiring linkage to 
those without such a requirement, we would place Mexico in the latter category, but doing so 
would be misleading. Or, if we were to compare prices in countries with linkage systems to 
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those without, regardless of the trade agreement, the results would make little sense without 
taking into account the particular characteristics of Mexico’s (and other countries’) systems. 
 
Or consider the effects of data exclusivity on prices. The analytic challenge is to see if market 
dynamics (e.g. number of competitors, prices) change on account of data exclusivity 
provisions. Bollyky (2016), for example, examines prices in two countries (Colombia and 
South Korea) before and after their trade agreements requiring data exclusivity went into 
effect.29 However, both of these countries began offering market exclusivity based on test 
data years before they had trade agreements with the US (Andia 2011; Cortés et al 2012; Son 
2016). For analyses of the effects of data exclusivity, one needs to look at the correct pre- and 
post-dates; if Colombia and Korea already had such provisions, the pre-vs-post analyses are 
flawed, and drawing conclusions of the effects of data exclusivity in before-and-after 
analyses based on the wrong dates is problematic (Kapczynski, Sampat, and Shadlen 2017).  
 
We have emphasized that, especially in “later patenting” countries, several of the provisions 
are only recently going to have an impact on drug prices, and that it may be premature to 
assess the impact of trade agreements. More generally, the details matter: in most cases it is 
not the date of the trade agreement per se, but rather other institutional details, that matter for 
identifying drugs affected by the agreements.  
 
Not only will different provisions affect competition and prices differently in different 
countries according to when countries introduced drug patents, the filing dates of drugs’ 
primary patents, and the details we have discussed, but the types of effects that these 
provisions may have will change over time too. As discussed, in the 13 later-patenting 
countries in the right panel of Table 2, not enough time has passed for requirements to issue 
use patents and create linkage systems to extend periods of protection on many drugs, but it is 
possible that they have affected the existence of exclusivity for older drugs that lack primary 
patents on account of pre-1995 priority dates. But these effects are transitional, and 
misleading indicators of how these provisions are likely to matter going forward. As 2015 
recedes further into the past, and more drugs have primary patents even in countries that did 
not allow pharmaceuticals to be patented until after 1995, the effects of these provisions will 
be on the duration – not the existence – of patent protection.  
 
The effects of data exclusivity may also be different going forward. Again, data exclusivity 
can create monopolies where patents are absent, as is the case with many older drugs. Indeed, 
the three previous studies of the association between TRIPS-Plus provisions and higher drug 
prices in Jordan and Guatemala (Abbott et al 2012; Malpani 2007; Shaffer and Brenner 2009) 
focused on data exclusivity, and noted that the reason why data exclusivity mattered for 
prices was the lack of patent protection for many drugs during the time periods studied. 
Where drugs have primary patents, however, these are likely to outlast (or at least 
substantially overlap with) the data exclusivity mandated in trade agreements. Thus, 
assuming we move to a world in which most drugs have primary patents, data exclusivity 
may become increasingly redundant, and its effects may diminish.30  
                                                          
29 Two other countries are discussed, as well, though with sample sizes that the author 
acknowledges are too small to allow for conclusions.  
30 It is possible that data exclusivity may matter more for large molecule, “biologic” drugs, 
where patent boundaries are less clearly defined, than for the small molecule, chemical drugs 
we have focused on throughout this paper. This is perhaps also why data exclusivity rules for 
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The effects of compulsory licensing provisions may also be different going forward. These 
have been used (or threatened) by some developing countries since TRIPS, and this may have 
affected prices. But in many cases compulsory licensing was possible because drugs in 
demand lacked patent protection in India, which did not allow for drug patents with pre-1995 
priority dates. Most compulsory licenses either authorize (or threaten to authorize) 
importation of drugs from India (‘t Hoen et al 2018; Waning et al 2010). If primary patents 
become more common in India, then, in the absence of local production capabilities, 
compulsory licensing may become less effective. Conversely, restrictions on compulsory 
licenses may matter mainly for secondary patents that are granted in some countries but not 
others.31  
 
Conclusion 
While TRIPS required countries to adopt pharmaceutical patents, which many did not do 
until that point, bilateral and regional trade agreements negotiated since then have tended to 
expand on the protections in TRIPS with additional provisions. This paper placed the 
inclusion of “TRIPS-Plus” provisions in trade agreements in the context of the broader spread 
of pharmaceutical patenting since the 1970s. We have examined the key provisions that are 
relevant for pharmaceuticals, considering how they appear in different agreements and the 
ways they may affect market dynamics and prices. We have also presented the principal 
challenges to observing the effects of these provisions, challenges related to timing and to the 
proper selection of drugs. The argument is not that trade agreements raise prices, or that they 
do not, but rather that it is for the most part too early to tell. Because of the timing of when 
countries began granting drug patents, the existence of drugs on the market without primary 
patents in many countries, and the nature of the TRIPS-Plus provisions we have discussed, 
analyses are bound to be inconclusive. 
 
Moreover, to the extent that TRIPS-Plus provisions have had effects, the sorts of effects they 
will have are likely to change going forward. In later-patenting countries, provisions that now 
may affect the existence of patent protection would mainly affect the duration of patent 
protection, under the assumption that most drugs will eventually have a primary patent in 
these countries. Indeed, as 1995 recedes further into the past, and if most drugs have primary 
patents in most countries, the importance of precisely when countries began allowing 
pharmaceutical patents will fade in significance.  
 
How can the effects of these provisions on prices be evaluated until then? Looking at the 
right sets of drugs in the right countries at the right points in time is crucial. Several previous 
analyses of TRIPS-Plus provisions in trade agreements, and even TRIPS, have found limited 
effects of pharmaceutical patent provisions on drug prices, and concluded that concerns about 
patents and prices were “overblown” (Bollyky 2016), that developing countries may be 
circumventing their obligations in these agreements, that drug patent protection may work 
                                                          
biologics was a major point of debate in the TPP (and TPP-11, after the US’s withdrawal) 
and the revised version of NAFTA (“USMCA”). 
31 To illustrate, imagine a drug for which the primary expires in 2030 in both India and in 
Country X that has a trade agreement with the US. If X – but not India – also granted a 
secondary patent that expires 2032, and X’s trade agreement restricts compulsory licensing, 
then, in the period between 2030-2032 the restriction on compulsory licensing will prevent X 
from acquiring the drug from India. 
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differently that we understand from the US experience, or that drug companies may be less 
aggressive in pricing in developing countries than in the past (Bollyky 2016; Duggan et al 
2016). These mechanisms are each theoretically plausible, but in our view should be tested 
directly rather than asserted.  
 
More importantly, before falling back on these residual explanations it is essential to focus on 
the specific drugs affected by the trade agreements, with precise attention to the institutional 
details of implementation. As we have emphasized throughout this paper, for some provisions 
in trade agreements that influence competition near the end of patent terms, the number of 
affected drugs may still be small in many countries, especially those that implemented 
pharmaceutical patent protection only after TRIPS. More generally, we suggest that 
theoretical and empirical analyses of these agreements going forward (and the policy 
discussions of these agreements) should carefully distinguish between their transitional 
effects and the long-run steady state effects in developing countries.  
 
One way of capturing the steady state effects on drug prices would be to focus attention on 
the earlier-patenting countries that were allowing pharmaceuticals to be patented prior to 
TRIPS, and that have trade agreements with the US, i.e. those on the left side of Table 2. In 
these countries, where most drugs are likely to have obtained primary patents and many of 
these patents have reached their expiration dates, the transitional dimensions of TRIPS that 
we have emphasized throughout this paper are less relevant. As a result, we can observe how 
the TRIPS-Plus provisions in trade agreements function in contexts that are more akin to how 
the world will look going forward. Does patent term restoration extend periods of patent 
protection? Do use patents and linkage add additional years of exclusivity beyond the 
expiration of primary patents? Does data exclusivity matter for drugs that already enjoy 
patent protection? Does generic competition commence and do prices decrease after primary 
patents expire? Addressing these questions could provide a fruitful avenue for future 
research.  
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Figure 1 
The Globalization of Pharmaceutical Patenting 
 
 
Note: Authors’ elaboration based on data in the supplemental appendices of Liu and La Croix 
(2015).  
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Table 1 
US Trade Agreements and Pharmaceutical Patent Provisions  
 
Partner 
Country 
Year * Term 
restoration  
Use 
patents 
Linkage  Data 
Exclusivity  
Compulsory 
Licensing 
Australia 2005 √ √ √ √ √ 
Bahrain 2006 √ √ √ √  
Canada** 1994    √  
Chile 2004 √  √ √  
Colombia 2012   √ √  
Costa Rica*** 2009 √  √ √  
Dom. Rep*** 2007 √  √ √  
El Salvador*** 2006 √  √ √  
Guatemala*** 2006 √  √ √  
Honduras*** 2006 √  √ √  
Jordan 2001 √  √ √ √ 
Mexico** 1994    √  
Morocco 2006 √ √ √ √  
Nicaragua*** 2006 √  √ √  
Oman 2009 √ √ √ √  
Panama 2012   √ √  
Peru 2009   √ √  
Singapore 2004 √  √ √ √ 
South Korea 2012 √ √ √ √  
 
*Year of implementation, i.e. not year of signature but year into force. 
** NAFTA. 
***DR-CAFTA. Went into effect on different dates in 2006 El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua, and then in following years in the Dominican Republic and Costa 
Rica.  
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Table 2 
Introduction of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Countries with US Trade 
Agreements 
 
Prior to TRIPS Following TRIPS 
Australia 
Canada 
Chile 
Mexico 
Singapore 
South Korea 
1990 
1983 
1991 
1991 
1994 
1986 
Bahrain 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Jordan 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Oman 
Panama 
Peru 
2004 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
1999 
2000 
2000 
2000 
1996 
2000 
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